The one U.S. system offered is articulated as the formal U.S. position.
MILDEP responsible for the weapon systems or technologies offered
USG personnel may not favor the merits of one U.S. proposal over another. U.S. advocacy must be generic - the U.S. proposals are combat proven, interoperable with many nations, technologically superior, worldwide supportable, etc. This neutral stance extends to USG presence in meetings with foreign officials. If USG personnel are present for one U.S. contractor presentation, every effort must be made to be present for all briefings on other U.S. offerings. Only when one U.S. MILDEP and/or contractor team remains in the competition can the United States advocate one U.S. offering. This occurs if all other MILDEP and/or contractor teams self-eliminate or the foreign nation formally states these proposals are no longer under consideration.
C4.3.1.3. Responsibilities of the Department of Defense Lead Managing the United States Government Response. The DoD lead facilitates the USG’s deliberative processes in order to develop the policy decisions that affect the proposals as early as possible. The DoD lead obtains the views of the key USG stakeholders: Department of State (State), the Department of Commerce (DOC), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD(A&S)), Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), DSCA, and the MILDEPs. The DoD lead ensures MILDEP and/or contractor teams submit proposals that are consistent with internal U.S. decisions, are as responsive as possible to the requirements of the foreign solicitation and meet the solicitation’s schedule. In cases of multiple U.S offerings, the DoD lead must facilitate all U.S. proposals impartially so that there is no perception that one offering is preferred over another and there is no biased interpretation of policy. The DoD lead must bring together all competing MILDEP and/or contractor teams to highlight issues, perform joint problem solving, establish plans and agreements, ensure that the U.S. entrants are being held to the same standards, address cross-cutting issues, and coordinate responses with the foreign purchaser.
C4.3.2. Total Package Approach. The Total Package Approach (TPA) ensures that FMS purchasers can obtain support articles and services, to include construction of necessary support facilities, required to introduce and sustain equipment and to operate in a responsible and effective manner consistent with U.S. intent in approving the transfer. The complete sustainability package must be offered to the purchaser when preparing Price and Availability (P&A) data or LOAs. In addition to the system itself, other items to consider in a total package include: training, technical assistance, initial support, software, ammunition, follow-on support, etc.
C4.3.3. False Impressions. Problems can occur when foreign purchasers expect to obtain certain articles and services from the USG but conditions prevent these sales. NDP specifically requires avoidance of creating false impressions. USG personnel must consider releasability, disclosure, sanctions, and all required coordination before indicating to a potential purchaser that a sale from the USG is possible. See Section C3.2.2.
C4.3.4. Neutrality. DoD prefers that countries friendly to the United States fill defense requirements with U.S. origin items. Unless an item has been designated as “FMS Only,” DoD is generally neutral as to whether a country purchases U.S.-origin defense articles or services commercially or through FMS channels. In some instances, such as for certain Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and Government Furnished Materiel (GFM), Arms Export Control Act (AECA), section 38(a)(3), (22 U.S.C. 2778)) controls apply and items are sold only via FMS.
C4.3.5. Foreign Military Sales-Only Determinations. The AECA gives the President discretion to designate which military end-items must be sold exclusively through FMS channels. This discretion is delegated under statutory authority to the Secretary of State. Generally, as a matter of policy, this discretion is exercised upon the recommendation of DoD.
C4.3.5.1. State approves or disapproves all arms sales and is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all sales. Each MILDEP or DoD Component develops recommendations for FMS-Only designations on specific weapons systems and military technologies considering the criteria in Section C4.3.5.3. and Section C4.3.5.4. The MILDEP or DoD Component forwards related recommendations and rationales for adding or removing such FMS-Only systems designations to DSCA (Office of International Operations (IOPS)) and Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA). DSCA will provide such recommendations to State for its review and approval/disapproval. Through the export licensing process for DCS, overseen by the State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (State (DDTC)), DTSA will review licensing requests to ensure license requests are consistent with FMS-only designations. Requests for further assistance with FMS-Only designations should be directed to DSCA (IOPS) for reconciliation or referral to the appropriate DoD element for resolution.
C4.3.5.2. Foreign Military Sales Only List. The key purpose of this list and related USG processes is the codification and more consistent application of the USG requirement that certain military items be sold only on a government-to-government basis. The following is a listing of military capabilities and systems by general category that the USG broadly considers to be available for export solely on an FMS-Only basis. Inclusion of items on the below list should not be construed as a change to policy as it exists as of September 2016.
C4.3.5.3. State uses four general criteria to determine whether a sale should be required to proceed through the FMS process: Legislative/Presidential restrictions; DoD/MILDEP policy, directive, or regulatory requirement, e.g., the NDP; government-to-government agreement requirements; and interoperability/safety requirements for U.S. Forces.
C4.3.5.4. These State criteria, also outlined under DoD/MILDEP policy, can be further understood by considering four possible elements:
C4.3.5.4.1. United States Political-Military Relationship with the End User. The geopolitical situation and security relationships are taken into account when considering the appropriateness of recommending FMS-Only. The inherent strengths of FMS or DCS licensing methods are also considered in selecting the method that best suits the interests of the United States and the foreign purchaser within the context of existing global security circumstances.
C4.3.5.4.2. Sale of a New or Complex System or Service. DoD may recommend FMS-Only:
C4.3.5.4.2.1. To maximize the purchaser's ability to assimilate the technologies and manage its acquisition/logistics.
C4.3.5.4.2.2. For enhanced interoperability and cooperation between U.S. and purchaser military forces.
C4.3.5.4.2.3. For end-items or services that require complex systems integration with other combat systems.
C4.3.5.4.2.4. For end-items or services that require access to sensitive USG databases, libraries, or software-source code.
C4.3.5.4.2.5. For end-items or services that require Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) or on-site accountability.
C4.3.5.4.3. Diversion and Exploitation of Defense Systems Technologies. Security of sensitive technologies requires greater scrutiny in the transfer process. Defense systems and munitions that are not particularly complex or sensitive but still require enhanced control to prevent proliferation to rogue states or terrorist organizations represent another area where FMS may be more appropriate than DCS.
C4.3.5.4.4. Feasibility of Separating Weapon System Components into Foreign Military Sales/Direct Commercial Sales Elements. At times, purchasers may desire all or a portion of a sale to be DCS. In instances where possible, FMS-Only aspects of a purchase may potentially be separated from the portion that can be sold DCS.
C4.3.6. Direct Commercial Sales Preference. Companies may prefer that a sale be made commercially rather than using FMS procedures. When a company receives a request for proposal from a country and prefers DCS, the company may request that DSCA (Office of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (SPP)) issue a DCS preference for that particular sale. The company’s request must include a copy of the purchaser’s solicitation for a price quotation. Approved DCS preferences should be held within Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and at the item manager level to allow proper screening of LORs. The process outlined in this section is a best efforts commitment by DoD. Failure on the part of the DoD Component to comply with these procedures will not invalidate any resultant FMS transaction. Before approving DCS preference for a specific transaction, the following are considered:
C4.3.6.1. Article or Service Exclusions. Items provided on blanket order lines and those required in conjunction with a system sale do not normally qualify for DCS preference.
C4.3.6.2. Specific Sale Exclusions. Articles or services that may otherwise qualify for DCS preference may be required to be sold through FMS procedures to certain countries and for sales financed with Military Assistance Program (MAP) or, in most cases, with Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds. The Director, DSCA, may also recommend to State that it mandate FMS for a specific sale.
C4.3.6.3. Price and Availability or Letter of Offer Acceptance Requests. DCS preferences are valid for one year. If during this time period, the Implementing Agency (IA) receives a request from the purchaser for the same item, it should notify the purchaser of the DCS preference, using the following text:
Figure C4.F1. Implementing Agency Notification to the Purchaser of Direct Commercial Sales Preference
[Company] has advised us that it is actively negotiating with you a program under which [article or service] is to be provided commercially.
AAlthough it has no preference as to whether this item is procured through FMS or on a commercial basis, DSCA does not normally provide price and availability information that could conflict with information formally requested from commercial firms. If a commercial transaction is undertaken, the USG shall not be a party to the contract; therefore, all aspects of contract performance must be between your government and the company.
Before we can provide FMS data, you must confirm that all commercial efforts have ceased and advise DSCA of the reason for this decision.
C4.3.6.4. The IA must determine whether commercial activity has ceased, determine whether guidance in Section C4.3.7. applies, or seek further guidance from DSCA (SPP).
C4.3.7. Concurrent Foreign Military Sales and Commercial Negotiations. Purchasers should avoid concurrent FMS and commercial requests. Concurrent negotiations occur when a purchaser seeks information both through FMS and from a U.S. commercial source to compare FMS and commercial pricing for the same item in an attempt to gain a negotiating advantage. IAs may not participate in FMS-commercial comparison studies unless the Director, DSCA, grants an exception for a specific circumstance. If the purchaser's national policy or specific circumstances require that both FMS and commercial data be obtained for the item to be procured, the purchaser should submit a request for exception with justification to DSCA (SPP).
C4.3.7.1. Foreign Military Sales Data Obtained First. If the purchaser obtains FMS data and later determines it should request a commercial price quote, the purchaser should cancel the LOR prior to requesting commercial data. If an LOA has been offered and the purchaser then solicits formal bids from private industry for the same item, the IA should query the purchaser as to its intentions and indicate that the LOA may be withdrawn.
C4.3.7.2. Commercial Data Obtained First. If the purchaser requests FMS data after soliciting bids from contractors, the purchaser must supply information to the IA showing that commercial acquisition efforts have ceased before any FMS data is provided.
C4.3.8. Travel in Support of Security Cooperation Programs. U.S. military and DoD civilian employees who travel to and from a foreign country on security cooperation (SC) business, regardless of whether the travel is financed by FMS administrative or case funds, must use the same commercial air carrier, class of service, and routing that the transportation officer requires of other DoD travelers. Waivers from the normal travel procedures will be granted to SC travelers on the same basis and in the same manner as provided for DoD personnel traveling on regular defense business. See the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) for Uniformed Service Members and DoD Civilian Personnel.
C4.3.9. Use of Federal Acquisition Regulation and DoD Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. When procuring for a foreign government, DoD will apply the same contract clauses and contract administration as it would use in procuring for itself, except where deviations are authorized in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). If a sole source procurement requested by a foreign government appears to be motivated by objectives in conflict with this requirement or with any U.S. legislation, the MILDEP’s proposed sole source denial memorandum must be forwarded to DSCA (IOPS), DSCA (SPP), and DSCA (Front Office, Office Of the General Counsel (FO/OGC)) for coordination.
C4.3.10. Diversion of Materiel. DoD policy requires a determination that the sale of a defense item will not degrade U.S. defense efforts by taking needed equipment from U.S. stocks (withdrawals) or disrupting deliveries of critical items from production for U.S. Forces (diversions) unless the sale of the item is in the overall U.S. national interest. See Section C6.4.6. for information regarding diversions.
C4.3.11. Purchasers must self-insure FMS shipments or obtain commercial insurance without any right of claim against the United States. This includes for returns. When requested by the purchaser, the IA may obtain insurance and include it as a separate LOA line item. For FMS cases already implemented, an Amendment can add authorized insurance coverage. Whenever an IA provides these services to a purchasing country or organization, it should obtain insurance from a U.S. insurance firm if possible. Providing insurance is an exceptional arrangement, and the purchaser should be encouraged to make arrangements for insurance on subsequent cases.
C4.3.12. Classification of Security Cooperation Information. SC information shall be unclassified unless State, the USD(P), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)), or the Director, DSCA, directs classification in a particular situation, or unless the national security classification criteria of Executive Order (EO) 13526, DoD Manual (DoDM) 5200.01 Vol. 1., and corresponding MILDEP regulations warrant classification for national defense purposes.
C4.3.12.1. Purchaser Requests to Classify Security Assistance/Security Cooperation Information. Under exceptional circumstances and when approved by any of the organizational elements above in Section C4.4.13. and DSCA, security assistance (SA)/SC information may be classified at the request of the purchaser. See Section 5.4.10. for information the purchaser must provide when making such a request. FMS purchasers should be discouraged from requesting classification of FMS cases and related information. Under certain circumstances, 10 U.S.C. 130c protects purchaser’s sensitive FMS information from public dissemination, although information so protected would not necessarily be classified. Congress has set a high standard for classification of FMS cases, and when congressional notification is required, AECA, section 36(b)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2776) requires a description of the damage to national security of the United States that could be expected to result from public disclosure of the information as justification.
C4.3.12.2. Factors Determining Classification. The primary factors considered by the State, USD(P), and the Director, DSCA, in requiring classification of FMS information are: whether the purchaser considers the information to be classified, the extent to which disclosure of the information would reveal the purchaser’s order of battle, taking into consideration the nature and quantity of defense articles sold and the degree to which the purchaser relies on the United States as a source of military supply; the extent to which disclosure of the information could be expected to stimulate demands by third countries upon the United States or upon other supplying nations for defense articles, thus encouraging global or regional instability or fostering an arms race; and to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the fact that a specific defense article is or may be sold to a particular foreign government.
C4.3.12.3. Levels of Classification. All SC information that is classified is CONFIDENTIAL unless State, USD(P), or the Director, DSCA, directs a higher level of classification, or unless the national security classification criteria of EO 13526, DoD Manual 5200.01 Vol. 1., and corresponding MILDEP regulations warrant a higher level of classification for national defense purposes.
C4.3.13. U.S. industry may request defense articles and services from the DoD to support a DCS to a foreign country or international organization. Defense articles and/or services provided to U.S. industry must be accomplished pursuant to applicable statutory authority including AECA, section 30 (22 U.S.C. 2770), which authorizes the sale of defense articles or defense services to U.S. companies at not less than their estimated replacement cost (or actual cost in the case of services) for incorporation into end items to be sold by such company on a direct commercial basis to a friendly foreign country or international organization. Section C11.5. further clarifies authorized DoD support (articles or services) under this section. It is important that defense industry representatives identify early in the DCS planning process whether support from the DoD will be required. If DoD support is deemed necessary, meetings with DoD representatives should be arranged to discuss the level of support required and the method for funding the associated costs.
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program transfers defense articles and services to eligible countries and international organizations. Arms Export Control Act (AECA) section 47 (22 U.S.C. 2794) defines the terms “defense article” and “defense service.” The U.S. Munitions List (USML) (22 CFR part 121) designates specific items that fall into these categories and includes an asterisk (*) by Significant Military Equipment (SME). Any item of SME that has a nonrecurring research and development cost of more than $50 million or a total production cost of more than $200 million is considered Major Defense Equipment (MDE). See Chapter 9 and Appendix 1 for the rules and charges regarding Nonrecurring Cost Recoupment (NCR) charges for MDE.
C4.4.1. Source of Supply. Defense articles or services may be sold from DoD stocks, or the DoD may enter into contracts to procure defense articles or services on behalf of eligible foreign countries or international organizations. DoD procurements for FMS use standard Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract clauses and contract administration practices except where deviations for FMS are authorized in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). Implementing Agencies (IAs) may procure from foreign sources as required to conduct FMS acquisitions in accordance with the DFARS under the same acquisition and contract management procedures used for other defense acquisitions to meet U.S. standard inventory requirements. IAs should not enter into such sales arrangements for equipment not in the U.S. inventory unless DSCA (Office of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (SPP)), and DSCA (Front Office, Office of the General Counsel (FO/OGC)) have approved an exception.
C4.4.2. Materiel Standards. It is DoD policy that defense articles sold under FMS programs should reflect favorably upon the United States. Defense articles offered and sold under FMS are new or unused or, as a result of refurbishment, possess original appearance insofar as possible and, as a minimum, have serviceability standards prescribed for issue to U.S. Forces. If the purchaser desires exclusively new equipment, this requirement is stated in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). If the purchaser wishes to purchase “as is” (no assurance of serviceability), this is also stated in the LOA. In addition to full disclosure of item condition, the purchaser is informed of unusual safety or environmental risks known at the time of sale. This information is included in the LOA with reference to separate publications or correspondence as appropriate.
C4.4.3. Logistics Support. The DoD considers the support of U.S. origin defense articles critical to the success of the security assistance (SA) program. Systems in use with U.S. Forces are supported through the DoD procurement system. Support items that are stocked, stored, and issued due to common application with end items in use should be provided even though the end items may have been acquired commercially or system support buyout is complete. See Chapter 6.
C4.4.3.1. When a system is to be phased out of the DoD inventory, countries that have acquired the system under FMS are given the opportunity to determine item requirements and to place final orders designed to maintain system capability through its service life. These orders are consolidated to ensure economic buys. See Section C6.4.7.
C4.4.3.2. DoD will take reasonable steps to support systems that are not used by U.S. Forces including items that were never adopted by U.S. Forces. Support is provided for these items when mutually satisfactory arrangements are made with the country involved and supply sources are available. Effort is made to support non-standard items, whether acquired commercially or through FMS, when this effort serves U.S. interests.
C4.4.4. Communications Security Equipment. A Combatant Commander’s (CCDR’s) requirements to communicate with foreign governments via secure transmissions will necessitate a requirement for release and delivery of U.S. communications security (COMSEC). Transfer of U.S. COMSEC must be done in conjunction with a Combatant Command’s (CCMD’s) interoperability requirement or otherwise support a U.S. policy objective. See Section C3.1. and Section C3.2. for information on the technology transfer process. See Section C3.7.3. for information on information security (INFOSEC) case processing.
C4.4.5. Coproduction policy is provided in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2010.06. Per DoDI 5530.03, the Director, DSCA must provide written approval to enter into negotiations for coproduction programs pursuant to an LOA. Requests for DSCA authority must include a description of the project as well as fiscal and legal memoranda. Discussions on coproduction programs may be initiated by the IA or by authorized representatives of foreign governments or international organizations. When partially or fully implemented through DoDI 5530.03 agreements, the IA’s recommendation is forwarded to DSCA for authorization to proceed and includes the information shown in Table C4.T5.
Table C4.T5. Information Required for Defense Security Cooperation Agency Authorization of Coproduction Agreements
The program origin, nature, scope, and supporting rationale
Implications of proposed technology transfer, including the scope and limitations of any needed National Disclosure Policy (NDP)-1 exceptions
Impact on U.S. industry prime and subcontractors, and the views of these producers
Impact on any other authorized foreign production of the same article
Impact on the U.S. production base for the article
C4.4.5.1. Foreign Military Financing Funded Coproduction Program. AECA, section 42(b) (22 U.S.C. 2791(b)) requires the Department of State (State) to advise Congress prior to use of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to finance coproduction or licensed production in a foreign country. DSCA (Office of International Operations (IOPS)) memoranda to State advises of the country, type of proposed transaction (FMS LOA or Direct Commercial Sales), description of program, the extent of foreign production, and impact on employment and production within the United States. Normally approval is staffed concurrently with the related AECA, section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)) notification. DSCA (IOPS) shall not approve release of an FMS LOA or FMF funding until State has advised Congress.
C4.4.6. Monitoring Coproduction Agreements. LOAs or DoDI 5530.03 agreements are structured to assure there are acceptable monitoring provisions for each program and the IA receives adequate data to prepare status reports. When USG responsibilities can be satisfied only with access by USG personnel, a note must be included in the LOA and the DoDI 5530.03 agreement. See Appendix 6 Coproduction Reporting and/or Validation for the exact note wording.
C4.4.7. Design and Construction Services. AECA, section 29 (22 U.S.C. 2769) authorizes the sale of design and construction services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations provided that full costs are paid to the United States.
C4.4.7.1. Design and construction services are offered under normal FMS procedures. Management and oversight of design and construction services is performed by construction agents designated by DoD Directive (DoDD) 4270.5. When part of a larger program, construction services may be provided in two ways:
C4.4.7.2. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for construction cases when it is the construction agent designated by DoDD 4270.5. For other construction cases, the IA will provide construction services through its designated construction agent. In this latter situation, the IA and construction agent will conclude an internal agreement to provide for USG management of the construction by the construction agent and to define program management relationship.
C4.4.8. White Phosphorous Munitions. Requests for white phosphorus munitions should be submitted in accordance with the procedures explained in Table C5.T1g. Requests should indicate the type of ammunition, the quantity, and the intended use. Requests should be accompanied by the U.S. Mission’s opinion as to whether the amount requested is reasonable in relation to the intended use, current on-hand inventories, and predictable usage rates of such items. Requests must also contain assurance from the host Government that white phosphorus munitions are used only for purposes such as signaling and smoke screening. DSCA (IOPS) shall coordinate the request. Upon approval, DSCA (IOPS) advises the DoD Component and provides the special conditions that must be included in the LOA.
C4.4.9. M-833 and Comparable Depleted Uranium Rounds. FAA, section 620J (22 U.S.C. 2378a) allows the sale of M-833 depleted uranium ammunition and comparable anti-tank rounds containing a depleted uranium penetrating component to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries, Major Non-NATO Allies, and countries for which a Presidential national security interest determination has been completed. Such a determination (Presidential Determination No. 94-37 of July 19, 1994) has been completed for the M-833 round for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and the M-829 round for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
C4.4.10. Ship Transfers. Vessels 20 years old or more and no more than 3,000 tons (light load displacement) or less may be transferred after 30 continuous days of the date that the U.S. Navy (USN) notifies Congress of its intent to make the transfer. Naval vessels that are less than 20 years old or more than 3,000 tons may be transferred only after enactment of legislation authorizing the transfer. 10 U.S.C. 8677 prescribes these criteria and Congressional oversight provisions. See Section C11.3. for information on Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Congressional notification requirements.
C4.4.11. Technical Data Packages for Defense Articles Manufactured by Watervliet Arsenal. Technical Data Packages (TDPs) from a government-owned and operated defense plant manufacturing large caliber cannons (e.g., Watervliet Arsenal) to a foreign government, or assistance to a foreign government in producing defense items currently manufactured or developed in a government-owned and operated defense plant manufacturing large caliber cannons, may be transferred if the statutory exceptions in 10 U.S.C. 7542 are met. The Secretary of the Army must determine if these requirements can be met before committing to such transfers; notify the Congress of every transfer agreement; and submit a semiannual report to Congress on the operation of this law and all agreements entered into under it.
C4.4.12. Stinger/Man-Portable Air Defense System. Transfer of U.S.–origin Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) and components is based upon the recipient’s ability and commitment to implement security and accountability controls at least equivalent to those employed by the United States, which exceed the Wassenaar Arrangement’s elements for export controls of MANPADs. All organizations involved within the security cooperation (SC) enterprise and their personnel, to include Military Departments (MILDEPs) and Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), must get specific approval from DSCA (Office of International Operations, Weapons Directorate (IOPS/WPN)) prior to any discussions on MANPADS with any potential purchaser. This includes discussion of sales for replacement batteries, parts, components, or expendables for MANPADS. This requirement stands even for countries previously sold MANPADS or approved for MANPADS sales. See Table C5.T1f. and Chapter 8 for more information on Stinger/MANPADS.
C4.4.13. Foreign Liaison Officer Support. Countries may locate a representative in the United States to assist with their programs. LOAs may be written to cover administrative costs (e.g., office space, secretarial support) for these personnel. See Section C4.5.1. for the types of foreign representative services and expenses that may not be included on an LOA. For more information about visits, assignments, and exchanges of foreign nationals See DoDD 5230.20.
C4.4.14. Night Vision Devices. Night Vision Devices (NVDs) are man-portable devices that incorporate image intensification, infrared, thermal, or sensor-fused technologies. NVDs fall under Category XII(c) of the USML (22 CFR part 121) and are designated as sensitive, unclassified SME. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) is responsible for NVD export policy and requires the case-by-case review of all requests for the international transfer of such items through FMS or direct export licensing. Each review considers input from the MILDEPs, the acquisition community, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Image intensifier tubes ordered as spare parts or replacements for destroyed, lost, stolen, or missing devices also require a case-by-case review except when replacing defective or damaged tubes that are returned to the USG on a direct exchange or repair and return basis. Unless otherwise requested in writing by the purchaser, FMS customer requests for NVDs, and for image intensifier tubes ordered as spare parts or replacements must be fulfilled with image intensifiers that meet U.S. military specifications, except for Figure of Merit (FoM), Halo, and other specific, associated performance parameters required to meet export authorization provisos. NVDs taken from DoD stock may not be sold or transferred without an accompanying data sheet verifying that the technical capabilities of the image intensifier tubes do not exceed export restrictions. Detailed guidance on procedures for processing NVD requests is contained in the NVD Handbook. Also see Chapter 8 for End Use Monitoring (EUM) responsibilities.
C4.4.15. Medical Countermeasures. Requests from partner nations to procure medical countermeasures, such as drugs, vaccines, other medical interventions against biological and chemical agents, and associated equipment, require the approval of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security/Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (ASD(HD&GS/CWMD)). It is essential that IAs provide copy of the Letter of Request (LOR) to DSCA (SPP) no later than 10 working days from LOR receipt to allow sufficient time for staffing with ASD (HD&GS/CWMD). DSCA (SPP) will inform the IA if the request is denied.
C4.4.16. Geospatial Intelligence. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) provides the capability to visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. It consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (topographic, aeronautical and hydrographic maps, and charts data). GEOINT is essential to the guidance systems in many weapons. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) GEOINT data are either shared with the international community through agreements and arrangements under the authority of the Director of the NGA and/or the Director of National Intelligence or can be purchased from NGA. IAs are responsible for coordinating the release of the GEOINT data with NGA in advance. See Table C5.T1d. for additional information.
C4.4.17. Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Transfers of U.S. Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to eligible countries and international organizations must support a CCDR’s interoperability requirements or U.S.G policy objectives. A partner nation's desire to be interoperable with the United States is insufficient justification for release. Coordination with DSCA, the respective CCMD, IAs, and the SCO is necessary prior to the partner nation submitting a C4ISR LOR. See Section C3.7.3. for more information on C4ISR and Table C5.T1c. for more information on processing LORs for C4ISR.
C4.4.18. Air-to-Surface and Indirect Fire Surface-to-Surface Munitions and their Delivery Systems. The Total Package Approach requires consideration of targeting infrastructure necessary for the effective and responsible employment of air-to-surface (A/S) munitions greater than or equal to 105mm in diameter, ship-to-shore munitions, indirect fire surface-to-surface (S/S) munitions, and the associated A/S and S/S delivery systems. A U.S. targeting solution is required unless the IA has determined that the country has a sufficient previously-established U.S., indigenous, or third-party solution for targeting infrastructure, as applicable under Table C4.T6. The IAs will coordinate to designate a lead IA for this process if more than one IA is involved in case development. In international competitions involving more than one U.S. bidder, DSCA will provide guidance to the IAs to ensure a common targeting solution is offered across platforms, where applicable. If a common targeting solution is not otherwise available, the lead IA will offer the Digital Imagery Exploitation Engine (DIEE) targeting solutions managed by the default Program Office, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), regardless of the requested munition(s) or delivery system.
C4.4.18.1. The IA must follow the process in this section for all LORs upon which the IA will act, whether LORs for LOA, Pre-LOR Assessment Requests (PARs), or for Price and Availability (P&A) responses that include LOA-quality data in response to a competition. If this process was followed for a P&A response, it may not need to be executed again once the related LOR for the same munitions and/or delivery system (i.e., same Military Articles and Services List (MASL)) is received. If the request is not one of the types of requests identified above, responses should note, at a minimum, that the case may require an additional advanced target development capability, including a target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering, and/or collateral damage estimation capability.
C4.4.18.2. Within 14 calendar days of receipt of an actionable LOR for LOA, or P&A that includes in-scope munitions, delivery systems, and/or components, the lead IA shall enter LOR Advisory data into the DSCA (IOPS/WPN) Targeting Infrastructure Management Portal (not publicly available) or submit the LOR Advisory to DSCA (IOPS/WPN) via Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRnet) email dsca.ncr.iops.list.wpns-civ-mil@mail.mil. The information required for an LOR Advisory is detailed in Figure C5.F1b. An IA Advisory is not required for types/families of munitions/fuzes that have already been reviewed and approved during previous LOR advisories. Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) and weaponeering requirements vary by munition, so partner requests must go through this process for each munition/fuze type or family not previously approved.
C4.4.18.2.1. DSCA will inform the IA no later than 14 calendar days after receipt of the Advisory, if it concurs or disagrees with the IA recommendation on the inclusion/exclusion of a U.S. targeting solution. If DSCA disagrees with the exclusion of a targeting solution, it will facilitate an interagency decision, with the IA, geographic Combatant Command (CCMD), and Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (State (PM)), on the targeting infrastructure requirements. The IA may continue to process the LOR while awaiting DSCA’s response. Once any resulting P&A or LOA has been offered to the customer, the IA may provide, on a case-by-case basis, any P&A or LOA preparation impact analysis to the DSCA (Office of Administration, Performance Improvement and Effectiveness Directorate (ADM/PIE)), who will adjust the timelines and standards for these individual cases, if appropriate.
C4.4.18.3. Regardless of whether a targeting requirement is identified in the LOR, DoD will build a targeting solution into transfers that require it. The targeting solution may be in a separate LOA. A targeting solution must account for software, data, training, and applicable publications, in line with Table C4.T6. However, if DoD personnel participate in a LOR generation discussion with a partner for an in-scope item, they will recommend the inclusion, at a minimum, of the following standard language:
"Advanced target development capability to support the effective use of U.S.-origin munitions, including the following: [identify munitions here]. This capability should include, at a minimum, a target coordinate mensuration [if munition is coordinate-seeking], weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation capability."
C4.4.18.4. Targeting infrastructure, as referenced throughout Section C4.4.18., refers to advanced target development (ATD). ATD includes three capabilities: target coordinate mensuration (TCM), weaponeering, and CDE. Targeting infrastructure associated with ATD includes the software, data, and training necessary to conduct TCM, weaponeering, and CDE. TCM, weaponeering, and CDE improve mission effectiveness and help partner nations fulfill their obligations under the law of armed conflict. TCM (previously referred to as Precision Point Mensuration (PPM)) is the process of generating geographic points at a level of precision and accuracy necessary for the effective employment of a coordinate-seeking weapon. TCM refers to the measurement of a feature or location to determine an absolute latitude, longitude, and elevation of a target. Weaponeering is the process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target by considering the effects of target vulnerability, warhead damage mechanisms, warhead fusing, delivery errors, damage criteria, and weapon reliability. Without accurate weaponeering analysis, military forces risk mission failure (not achieving the desired effect on the target) or unnecessary collateral damage. Accurate weaponeering results in efficient target-weapon pairing, optimizing the number of weapons required to achieve the desired effect on a target. CDE is the process of determining the potential for collateral damage resulting from target engagement. Without CDE, military forces risk unforeseen or unnecessary collateral damage.
Table C4.T6. Targeting Infrastructure Requirements by Munition Type